Journal of Applied Economic Research
ISSN 2712-7435
Organization of Metallurgical Industry Markets: Uncommon View
Orekhova S.V., Dubrovsky V.Zh.
Abstract
The research is aimed at doing a theoretical and empirical study of the industrial market mechanism using the case of seven sub-sectors of metallurgy. Systematization of the neoinstitutional, industrial approaches and the theory of organizational fields allows us to propose an architecture of the industrial market for the heavy industry. It is proved that the mechanism of the oligopolistic market is based on a hybrid organization form. This form has quasi-market pricing, special contract relations and institutional interactions, and a network nature. This view of the market expands the boundaries and possibilities for its analysis. The level of competitive inequality is the main factor that determines the industrial market specificity. The authors justified a list of indicators for the competitive inequality level in the market. The market power of the largest firms in the industry was measured by computing the Bane index. Market concentration was calculated with the Hall-Tiedman coefficient. Comparative profitability is an indicator for the assessment of the market power level in the industrial market and its organizational fields (consumers). The research subjects are seven sub-sectors of the Russian metallurgy. We did a comparative content analysis of sub-sectors. Also we defined competitive inequality and calculated concentration indices, market power indices in 2009, 2012 and 2015. Despite the different levels of competitive inequality in the sub-sectors, they demonstrate a high level of market power. The confusion of markets and the total integration of enterprises in the metallurgy and in organizational fields testifies to the possibility of resource control by metallurgy enterprises. The results of the empirical part of the study confirm the existence of a hybrid form of the industrial markets organization. Such a coordination mechanism reduces a business' capability for developing and the quality of economic growth. Dynamic analysis of the sub-sectors of the Russian metallurgy demonstrates the volatility of economic indicators. The industries depend on external, macroeconomic shocks. This fact testifies to the weak manageability of markets by its participants and the state.
Keywords
industry markets; hybrid market organization; metallurgy; competitive inequality.
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About Authors
Orekhova Svetlana Vladimirovna – Candidate of Economic Sciences, Associate Professor, Department of Enterprise Economics, Ural State University of Economics, Ekaterinburg, Russia (620144, Ekaterinburg, 8 March street, 62); e-mail: bentarask@list.ru.
Dubrovsky Valeriy Zhoresovich – Doctor of Economics, Professor, Head of the Department of Business Economics, Director of the Institute of Economics, of the Federal State Educational Establishment of Higher School of Economics, Ural State University of Economics, Ekaterinburg, Russia (620144, Ekaterinburg, 8 March street, 62); e-mail: dubr@usue.ru.
For citation
Orekhova S.V., Dubrovsky V.Z. Organization of Metallurgical Industry Markets: Uncommon View. Bulletin of Ural Federal University. Series Economics and Management, 2017, Vol. 16, No. 3, 357-378. DOI: 10.15826/vestnik.2017.16.3.018.
Article info
Received April 25, 2017; Accepted May 17, 2017.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/vestnik.2017.16.3.018
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